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HOW NOT TO REGULATE AIR TRANSPORTATION
JAMES A. DURHAM*
There was a time when it was quite relevant to debate whether a particular
industry should be regulated by the Federal Government. In many areas of our
economy that question is now moot; certainly air transportation is a segment where
the decision to regulate is irrevocable. In this framework our attention is turned
to such matters as the appropriate objectives and techniques of regulation. These
are vital areas of inquiry in connection with the work of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, and particularly with its efforts to cope with the problems of air cargo which
have emerged since the recent war.
1
BOARD "REGUIATION" OF AIR CARGO
The so-called "regulation" of air cargo by the CAB, which this writer assumes
other contributors will describe extensively, need not be fully repeated here. It is
sufficient for the discussion to follow to recall but a few pertinent facts.
In early 1946 there were filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board fourteen appli-
cations for certificates of public convenience and necessity by new carriers seeking
to participate in air freight transportation.! At approximately the same time seventy-
eight persons sought authorization to engage indirectly in the air freight business
as forwarders.2 All applications were strenuously opposed by the entrenched pas-
senger carriers, or by their trade association, the Air Transport Association of
America. These latter efforts did not go in vain. It was not until May, 1947, that
the freight carriers which had managed to survive were permitted to operate tem-
porarily until final decision on their applications; 3 it was not until September,
1948, after most of them had been forced out of business, that forwarders were ex-
tended a similar temporary exemption;4 and it was not until July, 1949, more than
three years after the filing of the fourteen applications, that three of the remaining
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'Air Freight Certificate Case, Docket 8io, Examiner's report, at 21 et seq. One of the applicants
was Capital Airlines, a passenger carrier whose routes are limited to the eastern part of the United
States.
'Air Freight Forwarder Case, Docket 681, Examiner's report, at i. This number included the
Railway Express Agency, which proposed to handle both freight and express over the routes of both
passenger and freight carriers. The Agency has been permitted to move express only over the routes
of the passenger carriers, a status which has been reaffirmed by the Board's decision in the Air Freight
Certificate Case, Order Serial No. E-3o85, July 29, 1949.
'CAB Economic Regulations, Section 292.5, Order Serial No. 389, May 5, 1947.
'Air Freight Forwarder Case, Order Serial No. E-1968, September 8, 1948.
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cargo carriers were awarded certificates of public convenience and necessity, though
on a temporary five-year basis.5
While the Board's right hand finally gave this measure of recognition to the
new freight industry, its left hand meted out indirect obstacles and repudiations one
after another. For example, by July, 1949, the applications of most of the other
direct and indirect freight carriers had become academic by reason of their financial
difficulties. In great measure these flowed from a rate war begun in June, 1946,
and still continuing with but little Board interference. Initially the rates took the
form of below-cost contract rates, yielding in some instances as low as eleven cents
per ton mile,6 but once the independent freight carriers were permitted to operate
under temporary exemption from the certification requirement the entrenched car-
riers concentrated upon equally low rates for scheduled operations. 7 Finally, some
of the tariff filings were suspended by the Board,' and an investigation ensued
which terminated in an unusual minimum rate formula yielding revenues below
the costs of even the most efficient carriers. Almost immediately a stampede started
to bring the rates of most commodities down to the minimum,10 though the Board
had solemnly warned the industry that it would take "action" if this occurred.'
Up to this date the Board has done little to stop this defiance, other than to
order an "investigation" which may take years to complete,"2 and consequently
the rate war continues.
In fact, in some cases the Board has even made defiance of its minimum rate
order profitable to the entrenched carriers. This arises by virtue of the fact that
the mail subsidy awarded individual carriers under Section 4o6(b) of the Act is
determined according to the over-all "break-even" need, plus a return on "recog-
nized" over-all investment.13  In this setting losses experienced from freight rate
5Air Freight Certificate Case, Order Serial No. E-3o85, July 29, 1949. In the same proceeding a
certificate was granted to Airnevs, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Express Publishing Company
of San Antonio, authorizing this carrier to transport newspapers published by its parent and other
property to and from small cities in the Rio Grande Valley.
'N. Y. Times, June 12, 1946, p. 25, col. 5; Aviation Daily, June 6, X946; Air Freight Rate nves-
tigation, Docket 1705, transcript of hearing at 61-63. It is interesting to compare these with the 70
cent rates prevailing in 1944. See Hummon, Research Pays 0§ in Air Freight, U. S. DrP'T or AOIUCUL-
TURE, MARKETING ACTIVITIEs 3 (Sept. 1949).
7Air Freight Forwarder Case, transcript of hearing at W-25 89 ; Air Freight Rate Investigation, tran-
script of hearing at 65, 227.
' Suspension and Investigation, Air Freight Tariffs, 8 CAB 62x (947).
' Order Serial Nos. E-1415 and E-1639, April 2r, 1948, and June 2, 1948. The formula estab-
lished minimum rates of 16 cents per ton-mile on the first i,ooo ton-miles of any shipment, and 13
cents per ton-mile for ton-rufiles in excess of i,ooo ton-miles in any shipment.
'0 The average rate received by domestic carriers was but 12.68 cents per ton-mile in 1948. Dissent-
ing opinion of Member Jones in Air Freight Certificate Case, Order Serial No. E-3 o85, July 29, 1949.
Tariff filings in 1949 would have little impact upon this average.
"Order Serial Nos. E-1415 and E-z639, April 25, 1948, and June 2, 1948.
"' Class Rate investigation, Docket 3665, Order Serial No. E-24 86, February 21, 1949. Upon the
complaint of two of the all-freight carriers the Board did suspend certain tariffs designed to extend the
lowest possible rates under the minimum rate order to the whole country. Order Serial No. E-2bo 4,
October 18, 1948.
3 Of course, a small amount of total mail pay awards would be necessary in any event to cover the
cost of carrying the mails. But as Senator Johnson of Colorado, Chairman of the United States Senate
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cutting are for practical purposes treated as another expense of doing business. In
most of the mail subsidy awards made since the beginning of the rate war in June,
1946, the Board has simply ignored this problem. For example, in the Big Four
mail rate proceeding, which is by far the most important of these cases by reason
of the carriers involved,' 4 the Board's tentative opinions refer to the over-all need
of this group of carriers without reference to the fact that three of them have been
engaged in destructive freight rate cutting for over three years.'0 In five instances
the relationship between mail pay and freight losses has been faced by the Board,
and in three of these the Board has been willing to let the carriers recoup their
freight losses;' in a fourth instance freight losses have been temporarily disallowed
by an approach which suggests they may subsequently be allowed;' 7 and in the
fifth instance recoupment has been barred by an approach which shies away from
the issue.'- These actions were in direct contrast to the pious verbiage of a previous
Board opinion that reporting procedures would be employed to prevent the use of
mail subsidy to finance losses incurred in a rate war.19
Moreover, up until recently the Board has seized upon the flimsiest of procedural
excuses to prevent the nonsubsidized freight carriers from getting a clear-cut decision
on the mail-subsidy-freight-rate issue. Thus in the Air Freight Rate Investigation,
the Board indicated that this matter should be decided in mail rate proceedings,
2 0
but for several months thereafter when representatives of the freight industry sought
to present their case in mail proceedings they were either barred or ignored,' in
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, pointed out in an address before the Kansas City Chamber
of Commerce on July 1S, 1949, "Clearly the CAB is underwriting the airline commercial losses with
mail pay. No one knows how much of these payments are subsidy and how much is compensatory."
The Senator expressed the view that "to mix mail pay with subsidy is a sloppy and wasteful way to do
business." The formulation of mail rate policy from 1938 through mid-1946 is described extensively in
Burt and Highsaw, Regulation of Rates in Air Transportation, 7 LA. L. Rav. 378, 393 (946-1947).
" In the industry the "Big Four" identifies American Airlines, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Trans-
continental & Western Air, Inc., and United Air Lines, Inc. These carriers transported approximately
8x per cent of domestic air mail in 1948, and received approximately 50 per cent of the mail pay
awarded to domestic carriers. Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
8ist Cong., Ist Sess. 489, Appendix 1 (1949), and CAB recurrent reports.
"1 Order Serial Nos. E-1351 to 1355, March 29, 1948; Order Serial Nos. E-15S7 to 1521, May 7,
1948; Order Serial No. E-2484, February 21, 1949.
1" Branifi Airways, Inc., Mail Rates, Order Serial No. E-1931, September 2, 1948; Delta Air Lines,
Inc., Mail Rates, Order Serial No. E-x959, September 7, 1948; Capital Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rates, Order
Serial No. E-2675, April 1, 1949. In the latter proceeding, the Board tentatively has disallowed losses
arising out of the use of C-47 equipment, but has indicated its willingness otherwise to make up in
mail pay for freight losses providing the carrier abides by the below-cost minimum rates established by
the Board. Thus if a carrier receives 16 cents per ton-milefor transporting freight, which operation cost
the carrier 21 cents per ton-mile, the Board will pay 5 cents per ton-mile to offset this loss from freight.
" Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., Mail Rates, Order Serial No. E-271o, April 12, 1949. In
this tentative opinion the Board announced that cargo losses would not necessarily be underwritten,
depending upon the circumstances in "each case." Before a final opinion is issued the carrier is in a
position to demonstrate that this is a proper case for the use of mail subsidy to underwrite cargo losses.
s Pan American Airways, Inc., Transatlantic Services, Mail Rates, Order Serial No. E-2728, April
19, 1949.
'o Motions of Air Freight Forwarder Association, 8 CAB 469, 474 (1948).
'o Order Serial No. E-1639, June 2, r948.
" Order Serial Nos. E-2o35 and 2036, September 30, 1948; E-2o86, October 14, 1948; E-218 9 ,
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spite of quite a liberal policy on interventions in cases where there were important
issues2 Finally, in recent months the Board has granted "limited intervention" to
freight carriers in two mail cases where there is serious question that subsidy is
financing freight operations.23
The lack of reporting procedures that will permit a reasonably accurate com-
parison of the freight costs and revenues of the dominant passenger-mail carriers
is an amazing spectacle in this day of penetrating accountancy. By and large the
Board has simply ignored demands for the establishment of such procedures, as
in the Air Freight Rate Investigation where the request was so obviously relevant. "'
Recently legislation has been introduced which, among other things, would compel
separate reporting for air cargo; 25 this has been met with a Board-backed proposal
that Congress pass a resolution authorizing an exhaustive CAB mail pay study which
might require the Board to reallocate overhead costs among the various classes of
services rendered.20 It must be obvious that the time taken to get such a resolution
through the Congress, the period for the study, and the time necessary to put report-
ing procedures into effect would give the entrenched carriers abundant opportunity to
eliminate the remaining all-freight direct and indirect carriers through continued
use of mail pay to finance low freight rates. This approach on the part of the
Board, coupled with its inaction on this subject during the whole period of air
freight development, suggests the conclusion that the relationship between the Board
and the principal passenger-mail carriers borders on benevolent cooperation.
Nor has the Board sought a favorable climate for the implementation of its
decisions. After the freight carriers temporarily were exempted from the certifica-
tion requirement, they sought to develop new traffic from new points, and in
accordance with the economic regulation under which they were operating sought
Board permission to use such additibnal points. These requests were coldly re-
ceived,27 yet at least one Board member,28 to say nothing of the entrenched car-
November 12,. 1948; E-2296, December- 5, 1948; and E-2297, December x6, 1948. In these cases
where the Board has refused to permit intervention, representatives of the freight industry have been
permitted to state their position at a pro forma hearing before an Examiner subsequent to the issuance
of tentative mail rate opinions, as in the Braniff and Delta cases, note x6 supra. Since the Examiner's
report in mail rate proceedings does not discuss the merits of the case, however, whatever statements
of position that have been made at such pro forma hearings would appear to be of no significance in
the formulation of the Board's final decision.
22 1n the Air Freight Certificate Case, for example, some 65 persons or groups were permitted to
intervene formally, and in addition appearances were entered for some 27 others.
"' Order Serial Nos. E-2717, April 14, 1949 (Members Jones and Adams dissenting), and E-2733,
April 19, 1949.
2'See particularly brief of public counsel in Air Freight Rate Investigation, at 66, 69.
2 S. 1431, 8Ist Cong., Ist Sess. (1949). Unfortunately, this bill and a more recently offered sub-
stitute (S. 2437) contain formulae for the determination of mail pay which would give the principal
mail carriers alleged "compensatory rates" which in some instances would exceed the presently sub-
sidized rates.
-*S. J. Res. 92, 8ist Cong., ist Sess. (949).
2"Administration of the exemption order was delegated to the staff. See the briefs of The Flying
Tiger Line and Slick Airways, Inc., in Air Freight Certificate Case, discussing this matter.
" For example, see the dissenting opinion of Member Jones in the Air Freight Certificate Case,
Order Serial No. E-3o85, July 29, 1949, at 24-5.
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riers,20 continued to demand why the freight carriers were not serving a larger
number of points. Likewise, after finally granting the forwarders permission to
do business after two earlier rejections,"° in a routine order the Board almost imme-
diately whittled away the significance of its Forwarder decision by placing the en-
trenched carriers in the forwarder business.3 ' Moreover, after indicating that the
freight carriers would be permitted to handle express traffic," this rich source of
revenue finally was allotted to the passenger carriers exclusively. 3
The Board even gave the established airlines protection from the antitrust pro-
vision of the Act.34 In June, 1946, when the rate war began, the entrenched grand-
father group determined to employ rate conferences and a consolidated freight tariff,
and sought Board approval of this approach. The Board initially refused either to
approve or disapprove this agreement,3" but within two weeks after the filing of
motions requesting ex parte approval the Board concluded the matter by approving
the agreement!36 This action was taken with full realization-recognized in dif-
ferent ways in both majority and dissenting opinions-that the agreement could be
employed to cut down the new competition from the freight carriers. True enough,
as a technical matter this agreement was approved only temporarily, but of course
during the period when freight carriers were seeking certificates the device could
be employed by the established carriers to destroy their competitors. In this con-
text the real meaning of temporary approval was tantamount to final approval,
in as much as elementary knowledge of antitrust proceedings leaves no room for
doubt that a final decision would take considerable time and staff. As a matter of
fact, the Board's investigation of this particular agreement has not yet reached the
hearing stage after nearly three years37
Perhaps the most unfortunate thing about the foregoing type of public conduct
was that it occurred at a crucial time in the development of air transportation.
During the depression years, when government first moved to control the air trans-
portation industry, the emphasis was on using the mail subsidy device to give it
aid and comfort. The war prosperity substantially reduced the necessity for this
2' See particularly the briefs of American Airlines, Inc., and United Air Lines, Inc., in the Air
Freight Certificate Case.
"0 Order Serial Nos. E-1343, April 2, 1948 (Member Lee dissenting); E-1445, April 26, 1948 (Mem-
ber Lee dissenting); and E-1968, September 8, 1948 (Member Jones dissenting).
"' Order Serial No. E-2o23, September 28, 1948.
as Air Freight Forwarder Case, Order Serial No. E-s968, September 8, 1948.
"3 Air Freight Certificate Case, Order Serial No. E-3o85, July 29, 1949.
'Under Section 414 of the Civil Aeronautics Act the antitrust laws are applicable in the absence
of affirmative action by the Board under Sections 408, 409, and 412 of the Act. 52 STAT. 1004 (1938),
49 U. S. C. §494 (1946).
2Air Freight Tariff Agreement Investigation, Docket 2719, Order Serial No. E-179, December 12,
1946.
" Order Serial No. E-339, February 24, 1947 (Member Lee dissenting). For some reason the Board
did not see fit to publish in CAB Opinions this very significant step. In Sweeney, Policy Formation by
the Civil Aeronautics Board, 16 J. AIR LAw & CoM. 127, 157 (I949), the failure of the Board to pub-
lish significant policy decisions and opinions when not connected with a final determination is criticized
vigorously.
"The investigation was begun in December 1946; hearings are scheduled to begin in October 1949.
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type of aid, but once the demand for luxury travel tapered off and vendors of air
coach and air freight service gave challenge, the thinking of the established indus-
try38 and the Board fell back upon the old mail subsidy solution. The apparent
conclusion that no certificated carrier should be forced to endure bankruptcy 9 led
to the further conclusion that others should be discouraged from participating in
the further development of aviation, that the Board would employ its procedures
and taxpayers' monies to recoup the freight and other losses of such carriers, and
that the salvation of the early-born carriers, irrespective of the character of their man-
agement, was the prime objective of Board policy.
It would not be accurate to say that these were conscious Board objectives, or
even conscious staff objectives, though unquestionably many of the individuals par-
ticipating in the "regulatory" process, sometimes happily and sometimes unhappily,
were aware of the march of events. To some extent new economic factors were
sufficiently strong to override the usual attitudes, but only after enterprise outdis-
tanced and made the old solutions appear outworn and untenable. The caution and
inconsistent pattern of the Board's case-by-case approach is better understood when
the indecisive attitude of individual Board members is set out case-by-case. Member
Josh Lee, once regarded as an "expansionist" and friend of the new freight carriers, 0
(i) voted consistently to permit the forwarders to participate in air transportation,
the first time as a minority of one,4 (2) dissented vigorously when the Board ex-
empted the established carriers from the Act's antitrust provision during the rate
war,42 and (3) agreed to allow the freight lines to challenge the Board's mail pay
policy with respect to freight.43 Yet this same Mr. Lee (4) dissented when the Board
by a 3-2 vote awarded temporary certificates to three of the freight carriers.44 The
record of Vice-Chairman Ryan, once regarded as a "conservative" by spokesmen for
the well-established carriers,45 is equally anomalous, though almost the opposite. He
(i) originally voted with the majority to prevent the entry of forwarders, 4 and (2)
was in favor of the antitrust exemption for the established carriers.47 Yet it was this
same Member (3) who finally voted with the majority to permit forwarders to
operate temporarily without certificates after disagreeing two previous times,4  (4)
who finally agreed to letting the freight carriers challenge the use of mail pay to
finance freight losses, 9 and (5) who agreed that three of the freight carriers should
"E.g., testimony of Carleton Putnam, Chicago & Southern Air Lines Board Chairman, and W. A.
Patterson, United Air Lines President, in Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on S. Res. 5o, 81st Cong., ist Ses., 452-454, 67o-672 (1949).
" Chairman O'Connell has raised the question whether the bankruptcy process would not have cer-
tain advantages for air transportation. See Air Mail Pay Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, an address by
Chairman O'Connell before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on March 23, 1949.
"'Aviation Week, May 3, 1948, p. 43.
"Order Serial Nos. E-1343, April 2, 1948; E-1445, April 26, 1948; and E-x968, September 8,
1948.
"Order Serial No. E-339, February 24, 1947. "Order Serial No. E-2717, April 14, 1949.
"Order Serial No. E-3o85, July 29, 1949. "See note 40 supra.
"Order Serial Nos. E-1343, April 2, 1948, and E-1445, April 26, 1948.
' Order Serial No. E-339, February 24, 1947. - "Order Serial No. E-1968, September 8, 1948.
"Order Serial No. E-2717, April 14, 1949.
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be granted temporary certificates.50 His agreement to certificate these carriers and
to permit their intervention in mail pay cases came only after the former decision
was postponed in the fall of I948,'l and after his reappointment in early 1949 to a
full six-year term. Member Adams, whose recent appointment was well regarded
among spokesmen for certificated carriers, 52 had (i) taken the position that freight
carriers should be denied a hearing on mail pay, 3 yet at the same time (2) agreed
to awarding temporary certificates to three of the freight carriers.54 Prior to his
appointment to the Board, Member Adams was Director of the Board's Economic
Bureau, which is one of the two most influential positions on the staff. In that
capacity he undoubtedly participated in formulating Board policy with respect to
several of the aforementioned subjects," but there is no public record of his previous
thinking.
Greater consistency is apparent from the records of Chairman O'Connell and
Member Jones, though the conclusions they reached with respect to the aforemen-
tioned issues were diametrically opposed. The Chairman favored entry of forward-
ers into the business, 6 believed it appropriate to give the freight carriers a hearing
on the troublesome mail subsidy question,57 and favored certificates for the freight
carriers. ,8 In very forceful opinions of dissent, Member Jones reached the opposite
conclusions in each instance. Neither were members of the Board when the other
crucial questions were decided. O'Connell and Jones did agree upon the establish-
ment of a minimum freight rate5" and upon the backdoor entry of the direct carriers
into the forwarding business," as did both Members Lee and Ryan and as did Mem-
ber Adams in the latter instance. However, these unanimous votes are difficult to
evaluate. That the Board should interfere with a crippling rate war seems an obvious
necessity, whether the step was to keep the entrenched carriers from driving their
new competitors to the wall or whether it was to prevent the dissipation of the
assets of the certificated group. Because the minimum rate was established at a
below-cost level, and in view of the Board's willingness to use mail subsidy to make
up for freight losses, the minimum rate has had but slight impact upon either ob-
jective. The unanimous decision to let direct carriers in the forwarding business
could have been the result of general Board and staff agreement that the forwarder
decision made desirable mollification of the entrenched carriers; 6 it may have come
"o Order Serial No. E-3o85, July 29, 1949.
" Order Serial Nos. E-2io8 and E-2io9, October 2o, 1948.
2 See note 40 supra; American Aviation, March 15, 1948, p. II.
"Order Serial No. E-2717, April 14, 1949.
'* Order Serial No. E-3 o85, July 29, 1949.
"For a discussion of the influence of staff upon Board policy, see Sweeney, note 36 supra.
"Order Serial No. E-x968, September 8, 1948.
"Order Serial No. E-2717, April 14, 1949-
"Order Serial No. E-3o85, July 29, 1949.
'o Order Serial Nos. E-1415, April 21, 1948, and E-s639, June 2, 1948.
'" Order Serial No. E-2o23, September 28, 1948.
" The decision of September 8, 1948 in the Air Freight Forwarder Case was appealed by all of the
entrenched carriers but one. See American Airlines et al. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, Docket No. 9739,
U. S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit.
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from a desire to carry water on both shoulders; it may have stemmed from the
feeling that the matter was unimportant; there was a feeling that fairness required
the Board to permit the direct carriers to engage in forwarding on equal terms with
the newcomers engaged only in forwarding. If the latter was the case, the Board
would appear to have been unusually na've since, in the absence of minimum for-
warding charges exceeding the cost of this function (and no attempt has been made
to measure this cost), the subsidized mail carriers have no difficulty in absorbing the
losses necessary to drive the forwarders to the wall. Unfortunately, the failure of
the Board to issue an opinion in this matter postpones a statement of its position
until after the current investigation, 2 which again may take considerable time.
As might be expected, the Board's record on air cargo is symptomatic of its
over-all effort. The inconsistencies of the Board's ad hoc decisions involving route
extensions have been criticized; 3 and its recent vacillations on mail subsidy have
even evoked caustic comment in a dissenting opinion by Justice Jackson. 4 The
beneficiaries of Board decisions and CAB counsel in most instances can give long
.(explanations" of the Board's public acts and utterances, but these are sometimes
difficult to comprehend. Perhaps these "explanations" can be better fathomed in
the light of an examination of the CAB universe, and the relations between its three
components-the Board, its staff, and the industry.
Although the official reports of the Board and the usual expositions of its work
politely ignore it, the relationships between the staff and the Board (and individual
Board members), between the Board and the industry, and between the staff and
the industry vitally affect Board policies and decisions. At first blush this relation-
ship would appear little different from some of the other regulatory agencies, 5 but
in the case of aviation the additional factor that the agency is supporting the in-
dustry must be added. Board members are frequently on the friendliest of terms with
counsel or management of individual carriers. In many instances this starts from a
genuine interest in the problems of the particular carrier; in others it stems from
the fact that counsel formerly was an employee of the Board; and in some instances
Board members feel it discreet to keep these contacts warm lest, like former Chair-
man Landis, they find themselves politically unavailable for reappointment. But
irrespective of the genesis of these relationships, they obviously do not throw sand
in the machinery that grinds out mail subsidies and route extensions on a convenient
case-by-case basis.
As problems become more complex, Board members have increased their reliance
"' Order Serial No. E-2o23, September 28, 1948.
0 Westwood, Choice of the Air Carrier for New Air Transport Routes, 16 GEo. VAsH. L. Rav. xr,
r59 (1947-48); Sweeney, note 36 supra.
"Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 336 U. S. 6ox, 6o8 (1949).
" Even the ordinary relationships between an agency and an industry vitally affect regulation,
E.g., Marquis Childs, Washington Post, April 7, 1949, P. i, col. 3, discussing the Federal Power Com-
mission; editorial, Washington Post, April 22, 1949, p. 24, col. 3, discussing the Maritime Commis-
sion; Senator Johnson of Colorado, 95 CONG. REc. 4869 (1949), discussing the Federal Communications
Commission. For a discussion of this matter covering an earlier period, see E. PENDLETON 1-IRIINo,
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936).
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upon staff advice-a proposition repeatedly emphasized by the CAB survey officer
attached to the Hoover Commission on governmental reorganization."6 This raises
the question of staff attitudes, a matter which realistic airline counsel have not
overlooked. Fortunately for the latter, many of the most influential members of
the staff have been with the Board since its earliest days, when mail pay and grand-
father certificates were the primary matters of concern, and a few of them were
doing similar tasks for other agencies before the establishment of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. Because of a strong promotion-from-within personnel policy, and
because of internal operating procedures which with few exceptions limit access to
Board members to highly placed persons on the staff, such persons are now in a
position to express their very sincere thoughts that it is wisest to use "caution"
in the "regulatory" process, and that the Government has sunk so much subsidy
into a given carrier that this "investment" should be protected by further subsidy,
or by additional route extensions, or by the extinction of new competitors. After
all, Board members who think otherwise will come and go, but the entrenched
carriers are in the picture to stay. It takes no more than this to suggest to most
new employees that their future can be best protected by giving serious weight
to the suggestions made to the staff by representatives of the dominant carriers;
after all, most men are sufficiently ambitious to desire promotion within the civil
service and/or the proffer of airline employment at an even greater stipend. This
is not to suggest or imply that staff people are either dishonest or insincere; it
simply means that their conclusions are conditioned by the attitudes of their supe-
riors and that most staff personnel, high and low, are conditioned-usually subcon-
sciously-by the attitudes of airline counsel and management and by the process
of pulling one carrier after another out of economic difficulties.
Much has been written and said about the need for specialized counsel in prose-
cuting claims before government agencies. The necessity for specialized counsel is
difficult to generalize about, but its superior effectiveness in dealing wtih the CAB
cannot be overstated. It is not that specialized counsel is better prepared to file
motions, write briefs, and argue cases before the Board; the real value of specialized
counsel to an airline is counsel's knowledge of the various biases and ambitions of
Board and particularly staff members, of the complex human relationships that exist
among staff personnel, and of the tendency of certain division heads to make com-
mitments on their own without reference to action taken in other parts of the agency.
On different matters, different Board and staff members are approached; if possible,
an attempt is made to get bureau or division head A committed where it can be
anticipated that bureau or division head B will object, thus placing A in a position
where he will "lose face" if his commitment is overruled. Likewise, it is necessary
to know which of the staff are sufficiently influential to be worth cultivating. Such
intimate knowledge is a large part of the stock-in-trade of specialized aviation coun-
" Sweeney, note 36 supra.
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sel," some of whom have greater influence on specific Board decisions than do the
Board's own counsel.
This suggests the psychological setting in which "regulation" and "development"
of air transportation is approached. Except for the obvious public interest in having
more aviation, the attitude that the agency had a job of regulating to be done in the
public interest-in contract to carrier interest-never gained much of a foothold at
the Civil Aeronautics Board. In this context "regulation" is much more akin to
"playing the angles," and the statutory directive to "promote" and "develop" the in-
dustry comes down to rationalizing the amount of mail pay and route extensions
desired by individual carriers.
II
PLANNING Am TRANSPORTATION
Solutions to concrete problems of governmental administration do not come
easily, and air transportation is by no means an exception. However, by this time
it must be clear that the problems this industry presents require the formulation and
development of a comprehensive master plan for all air transport. The mere re-
drawing of the route structure map, which CAB has often threatened to "suggest"
to the industry but has yet to do,"8 is only one ingredient of the planning here pro-
posed. In addition, questions of the function and use of mail pay, and the place of
freight carriers, forwarders, air coach service, and super-luxury service, all need to
be rationalized and placed in their proper perspective. As has been elsewhere indi-
cated, there is abundant statutory authority for such an approach to air transport
regulation; 69 in fact, the Act practically directs such a course, since there seems no
possible rational way to use broad affirmative powers in "developing, promoting,
and encouraging" the industry by the case-by-case approach. It is this latter
approach, which according to some Board members protects the Board from "polit-
ical pressures," 70 which makes it so convenient to decide one subsidy or route case
without reference to any other, and which makes it so convenient to hand out
valuable considerations first to one contestant and then to another, depending upon
hunch, relationships between Board and staff and the individual carrier, and other
subjective factors.
" There will be considerable disagreement with Marquis Childs' concluding paragraph in a column
dealing with the recent "5 per cent" Senate investigation: "Everyone who knows Washington at close
range knows that the 5-percenters who have come into this inquiry are for the most part tie little
fellows. The big operators are the lawyers-out of both the Old Deal and the New Deal-who rarely
go into a courtroom. Their specialty is influence and knowing the right people and they make mil-
lions from it. An investigation that really dug into this phase of the influence industry would hit pay
dirt." Washington Post, September 1, 1949, P. 9, col. 4-
"A report by the CAB on revision of route structures was originally promised in February 1949,
and subsequently in July 1949. Sweeney, note 36 supra, at 152. This report has not yet been issued,
and the Board has not announced a new date for its publication. The route structure matter is dis-
cussed in Business Week, October 9, 1948, pp. 19-2o.
0 Durham and Feldstein, Regulation as a Tool in the Development of the Air Freight Industry, 34
VA. L. REv. 769, 791 (1948).
70 Sweeney, note 36 supra at 147.
How NoT To REGULATE AIR TRANSPORTATION
But how do we go about planning the future of air transportation, in view of
all the difficulties of procedure and relationship that are involved? How is it pos-
sible for the Board and its staff to approach their tasks in a psychological and mental
framework that is foreign to cooperating, negotiating, or compromising with the
group the agency is supposed to be regulating?
At the outset it is necessary to build a new relationship between the Board and
the staff. The loyalties of the staff must not be divided among different Board
members, the islands of independent authority among certain division heads need
elimination, and the staff needs to be protected from the "suggestions" of some of
the more effective airline counsel. The most practicable and effective way to bring
this about is to place the staff directly under the Board Chairman. In the case of
the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Chairman is designated by the President, and
consequently persons of greater public stature have been attracted to the Chairman-
ship than is the case of agencies where the chairmanship rotates.7' But this reor-
ganization need not preclude other Board Members from urging and relying upon
the staff for alternative solutions to problems of air transportation. Staff presentations
to Board Members need not be in terms of a single solution, which has been more
or less the tendency of the CAB, but in so far as a comprehensive master plan will
permit alternative solutions should be offered. The Hoover Commission on Re-
organization of the Executive Branch has recommended that all the independent
regulatory agencies place their staffs under their chairmen, 2 a suggestion which al-
ready has been followed in the case of the Maritime Commission 3 In the case of
the CAB, the present and historical relations between Board members probably
would require that internal reorganization of this character be initiated by the
White House.
Less opportunistic relationships between Board and staff also are dependent upon
selections to both groups of persons of broad perspective, creative imagination, and
unselfish devotion to the public service. The stars in our firmament of government
administration are largely a history of men and not organization charts. Of course,
the quality of appointments to the Board itself should be the President's concern,
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although greater public scrutiny of these appointments, as exists in the case of
Chairmanship appointments, might well lessen the effectiveness of suggestions made
by the carriers. Quite apart from this, however, were the staff to be directly re-
"The same has been true in the case of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Re-
serve Board, and the Federal Communications Commission, for example; and, now that the Chairman
of the Maritime Commission is designated by the President, at the latter agency as well. See editorial,
Washington Post, April 22, 1949, p. 24, col. 3, and cf. Letter to the Editor from George Killion, Presi-
dent, American President Lines, Washington Post, May 6, 1949, p. 24, col. 5.
" A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON REGULATORY CosmmissioNs By TE Coams .lSbON oN4 ORGANIZATION
OF THE ExECUTmvE BRANcH OF THE GOVERNMENT 5-6 (March 1949).
"The relation of the Chairman to the staff is set forth in U. S. Maritime Commission, Organization
and Functions, 14 Fed. Reg. 5350, §§5, 6 (August 27, 1949).
"The Hoover Commission Report on Regulatory Commissions, note 72 supra, makes the following
criticism of appointments to these agencies: "b. Appointments to membership on these commissions are
sometimes below desirable standards because of the inadequate salaries offered, or the failure of the
Executive to appreciate the importance of the positions." Id. at 3. (Italics supplied.)
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sponsible to the Chairman, the selection of higher-placed staff officers could turn
more on the ability and contribution of the candidate and less upon such matters
as seniority and popularity with the industry and Board members.
In this setting the agency should be in a better position to make full use of the
techniques of planning, of accounting, of engineering, of statistics, of budgeting, and
of administrative standards. The Board has authority to compel uniform accounting
under Section 4 o7(d) of the Act; however, it permits carriers to employ any system
of accounts desired in their own operations, providing expenses are uniformly re-
ported. In actual practice, expenses reported by individual carriers often are not
comparable because of a variance of the items comprising a particular uniform
account.7 The Board appears not to have taken seriously the need for objective,
efficiency-engineering studies, such as time and motion studies, although their use
is obvious in the case of cargo and mail handling. It may be that the reluctance
to determine the cost of carrying the mail has some relation to this attitude. As a
matter of fact, there are no really adequate objective data extant that point to the
cost of performing any service. The possibility of employing statistics as a control
device does not seem to be recognized.
It is in the failure of the agency to develop administrative standards, which
would implement and supplement statutory standards, that the record of the Board's
legal staff appears so inadequate. The legislative history of the standards of the
Civil Aeronautics Act-so relevant to the formulation of adequate administrative
standards-does not appear to be reflected in CAB decisions. Section 2 of the Act,
setting forth objectives which in effect direct the Board to employ regulation as a
means to developing, promoting, and encouraging aviation, by virtue of their indis-
criminate use has no real meaning or content. They are recited glibly by the
applicant who wants something from the Board, and are subsequently recited back
by the Board after the decision to play Santa Claus has been made. The Board
and staff do purport to give effect to the requirements of Section 401(d) that a
carrier be "fit, willing; and able" before issuing a certificate of public convenience
and necessity, although in nearly all cases the three standards are considered but
one.7" But what meaning is ascribed to these very significant legislative standards?
This writer is convinced that while in many cases a sincere attempt is made to
apply the standards fairly, to one examiner they mean one thing, to another some-
thing else, to different Board members still something different. Similarly, the
requirement of Section 4o6(b) that carriers maintain "honest, economical, and effi-
cient management" is repeatedly called into play in determining mail subsidy
awards, but again in application the meaning given these standards varies. There
are other statutory standards which have received inadequate administrative atten-
tion, but these are illustrative.
" In numerous mail rate proceedings the CAB's staff makes "adjustments" in carrier figures to
make data comparable. Such adjustments rarely appear in formal opinions issued by the Board.
" For example, see the opinion of the Board in the Air Freight Certificate Case, Order Serial No.
E-3o85, July 29, 1949. Cf. the West Coast Case, 6 CAB 961 (1946), supplemental opinion on recon-
sideration, Order Serial No. E-555, May x9, 1947, and the Hawaiian Intraterritorial Case, Order Serial
No. E-2496, November 29, 1948.
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The aforementioned statutory standards lend themselves admirably to the for-
mulation of concrete administrative standards that are relevant to the regulation of
air transportation. Each of the words "fit, willing, and able" and "honest, eco-
nomical, and efficient" can be given special significance. In the matter of awarding
certificates of public convenience and necessity, it would appear that the legislative
standard "willing" carries with it much more than the idea that a New York-
Chicago carrier simply wants a route extension to Milwaukee, as an example. If
the carrier's request for the extension stems from a desire to prevent another carrier
from being certificated, which is so often the case, there is an obvious lack of good
faith which would appear to be in conflict with a professed willingness to give the
best possible service between Chicago and Milwaukee. A carrier's willingness to
gain an extension may also be tested by the extent to which it has exploited its
existing route structure. If the same New York-Chicago carrier has been operating
an extension to Des Moines which it has not exploited fully, it would appear diffi-
cult to conclude that the same carrier was "willing" to give the character of service
to Milwaukee which is required by the "present and future needs of the foreign
and domestic commerce," to quote Section 2 of the Act. In this sense the carrier
may not be fully exploiting its principal New York-Chicago route, in which case
it could hardly be "willing" to operate a Milwaukee extension. The present air
map is full of route extensions which are not being fully exploited by certain car-
riers, but because mail subsidy is determined on the basis of over-all need there is
little incentive for either the surrender or exploitation of such segments.77 Whether
a carrier is "able" to operate a given extension would appear to be a matter of
financing and engineering. If the extension to Milwaukee will increase the carrier's
dependence upon mail subsidy, a serious question of "ability" arises. Likewise if
planes, ground crews, and pilots are insufficient, if Milwaukee cannot handle larger
planes or more flights without a new airport, if the extension will mean poor schedul-
ing at important points, then there are questions of ability present.
Even if a carrier is "willing and able" to operate an extension, it may not be
the "fit" carrier. Whether a carrier is "fit" should basically depend upon whether
the extension requested is consistent with the comprehensive plan for the develop-
ment of both the particular carrier and the entire industry. The proper application
of this standard of the Act would appear to require the Board to engage in com-
prehensive planning for the industry. Significantly enough, Section 2 of the Act,
which sets forth the declaration of policy, in two places specifically calls for the
development of an air transportation system which will meet future as well as
present needs.
The legislative standards "honest, economical and efficient management" are not
placed haphazardly in the Act, but are set forth in Section 4o6(b) as conditions
upon which mail subsidy may be provided the carriers. In effect they are limitations
" However, in a petition filed in 1948, Northeast Airlines requested that a portion of its Route 27
be transferred to another carrier. See CAB Docket No. 3337.
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upon the Board's power to dispense subsidy, but it is extremely difficult to show
more than a mild influence of these standards upon the work of the Board. The
same is true of the further condition upon the Board's authority to award subsidy,
namely, that such subsidies be related to the continuance of "the development of
air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality required. . . ." It
is this sentence of Section 4o6(b) which so clearly links the payment of mail sub-
sidies to the sections dealing with the declaration of policy and certificates of public
convenience and necessity; it is both of these sentences which point up the concept
of subsidy for use in fashioning a comprehensive air transportation system.
The Board has never concluded that subsidy should be denied because of the
absence of "honest... management. ' s Apparently the application of this standard
has not gone far beyond insisting that carriers do not take candy from babies. When
the Board tells the industry that freight rates must go higher and they immediately
come down, is not a serious question of "honest management" involved? When
the Board directs the filing of contract cargo rates in the midst of a rate war, and
these are not filed for two years, is there no problem of "honest ... management?"
When a carrier cuts freight rates below those of a nonmail competitor immediately
after receiving a large mail subsidy, should this be considered as an act of "honest
management?" What about including items in the uniform accounts which do
not belong there? What about making available to its officers stock options imme-
diately after negotiating, but before making public announcement of, a substantial
subsidy award? What about defying the United States Government in time of war?
Unquestionably the Board and its staff deserve credit for the attempt to require
better utilization of equipment through the use of the "efficient management" stand-
ard.79 Here, however, instead of developing norms for measuring "efficient man-
agement," the Board simply has assumed that the average carrier has "efficient
management" and makes no disallowance in mail subsidy cases unless utilization
is substantially below the average. The Board has developed no administrative
standards to implement the "economical management" standard of the Act, but
simply lumps this legislative standard along with the "efficiency" standard as if the
two standards were synonymous. s° It would appear that administrative standards
' ,,.. . Actually I do not know of any instance in which the specific finding of disallowance was
based upon dishonesty.
"I was merely paraphrasing the statute which has the three words in it. Actually the disallowances
with which I am familiar have been, in our judgment, examples of inefficient and uneconomical opera-
dons, and I do not recall any in which there has been an issue of dishonesty." Testimony of Chairman
O'Connell in Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. Res. 5o, 8ist Cong.,
Ist Sess. 139 (1949).
¢ The Board's approach to efficiency is described in Sweeney, note 36 supra, at I52-154.
"E.g., see the Board opinions in the current "Big Four" mail rate case referred to in note 15
supra; see also testimony of Chairman O'Connell, note 77 supra; O'Connell, note 39 supra; Sweeney,
note 36 supra at 152-154. It is not unusual that these two words should be regarded as synonymous.
In a recent review of the report of the Hoover Commission, David Cushman Coyle offers this inter-
esting criticism:
"Probably the chief fault of the commission's report is that it has accepted without clear definition
the words 'economy and efficiency,' used in the enabling act practically as synonyms, In this context,
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supplementing the "economical management" statutory standard might be con-
cerned with whether the carrier's economic planning is consistent with its own plan
of development and with the over-all planning job carried out by the Board. It
will be recalled that Section 2 is concerned with an air transportation system
adapted to meet future as well as present needs. It is encouraging that at least
Chairman O'Connell has recognized that "economical management" has a meaning
quite distinct from that of "efficient management,"' although there are as yet no
Board decisions recognizing the distinction and its possibilities.
The writer has no brief for any particular administrative standards, or for that
matter, for any specific use of the other techniques of planning; the foregoing are
merely suggestive. It does seem clear, however, that only by the wisest and maxi-
mum use of these tools will the Board be able to formulate a comprehensive master
plan for the regulation and development of both cargo and other traffic that can
gain the respect of all concerned.
III
LAw AND PLANNING
It may be remarked that the foregoing suggestions will remake the Civil Aero-
nautics Board into another Atomic Energy Commission, Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, or Department of Agriculture. It may be argued that as remade into a planning
arm of the government the CAB will be forced to abandon the case-by-case approach
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which was given to it by the historical
accident that aviation is a form of transportation which was once under the wing
of the ICC. Lest there be any misunderstanding, that is exactly what is proposed.
The growth character of air transportation requires planning rather than umpiring,
and if the CAB does not do the planning in the national interest the group sup-
posedly being regulated will do the planning in their own interest. In fact, much
of the history of aviation regulation under the Civil Aeronautics Act is no more
than this latter story.
Planning does not require conflict with any concepts of fair hearing, such as
those embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act82 and the Civil Aeronautics
Act.83 It requires only that procedural forms will not be used to obstruct substantive
decisions. The history of the OPA protest procedure 4 and the procedure of the
economy properly means not buying what you don't need, while efficiency means getting the most for
your money. That is, the words should refer on the one hand to policy, which is for Congress to decide,
and on the other to management, which is the President's job as administrator." N. Y. Times Book
Review, June 5, 1949, §7, p. 27, col. 2.
" O'Connell, note 39 supra.
5 60 STA'. 237, 5 U. S. C. §§sooi et seq. (1946).
S52 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §§4o et seq. (1946).
8 4 Unfortunately the history of the OPA protest procedure authorized by Section 203 of the Emergency
Price Control Act (56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U. S. C. §§9oi et seq. (1946)), has never been recorded.
Some of it is reflected in Nathanson, The Emergency Court of Appeals, in PRoBLzms iN PsucE Co trol.:
LEoAL PAsEs (HIs-rorucAL REPox-rs oN W^. AatINISAxrrON, GEN. PUB. No. ii, z947), and in Hyman
and Nathanson, ludicial Review of Price Control: The Battle of the Meat Regulations, 42 ILL. L. Rav.
584 (1947).
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Department of Agriculture in administering the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ment Act 5 suggest the feasibility of postponing hearings on individual cases until
after the regulation or plan has been promulgated."" Section iooi of the Civil
Aeronautics Act fully authorizes a procedure that will meet the special needs of
the agency's problem: "The Authority may conduct its proceedings in such manner
as will be conducive to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice."
Perhaps some comment is appropriate with respect to the place of administrative
standards as formulated by the CAB in the legal framework. Do they mean noth-
ing in an individual case, or do they replace the standards of the Act? These
questions may both be answered in the negative. In an individual case, admin-
istrative standards may be attacked as being inconsistent with legislative standards,
just as an act of Congress is frequently attacked as being inconsistent with our high-
est legal standard, the Constitution. The initial legal question upon judicial review
would appear to be whether the administrative standards are consistent with the
Act. If so, the remaining legal question would be whether the particular CAB
action-whether it be the master plan itself or a minor route decision-was con-
sistent with the administrative standards.8 7 Of course, once the agency relies on
such standards it is doubtful whether the courts would let it willy-nilly disregard
them; instead they would become rules of the game by which all parties would
abide8 8 It is this which makes them so important.
Such administrative standards and whatever comprehensive planning which
flows therefrom need not be static. In working out standards in a growth industry
such as aviation, two things must be kept in mind. In the first place, standards
must anticipate changes in the development of the industry. Secondly, standards
must be dovetailed with statistical controls so that if conditions change radically,
standards can be changed as well. In addition, it must be borne in mind that
experience with administering comprehensive regulations may require modification
of administrative standards, thereby necessitating revision of the master plan, and
in turn policy reversals on the part of the Board. However, it must be possible to
explain these reversals in terms of these changes. In this context, a decision by the
Board in a particular case in 1949 may be quite arbitrary and capricious as being
inconsistent with the master plan or with the agency's administrative standards,
yet ten years later be in perfect accord with the revised approach of the agency.
To the narrow legalist, such a procedure may appear at odds with the concepts
of Anglo-American jurisprudence. True enough, our early history found case law,
with its dependence upon the precedent of past decision, entirely adequate for a
simple and stable society. But following the Industrial Revolution and subsequent
S5o STAy. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. §6o8c (x5)(A) (946).
The opinions of the Department of Agriculture's Judicial Officer are published monthly in AoI-
cuiLrtn DECisIoNs. These opinions arc among the most significant rendered in the field of Govern-
mcnt regulation.
"' Cf. Gillespie-Rogers-Pyatt Co. v. Bowles, 144 F. 2d 361 (E. C. A. 1944); Armour & Co. v.
Bowles, 148 F. 2d 529 (E. C. A. 1945).
"8 C. Armour & Co. v. Brown, 137 F. 2d 233 (E. C. A. 1943); Hillcrest Terrace Corp. v. Brown,
137 F. 2d 663 (E. C. A. 1943).
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economic dislocations our community lost its faith in the administration of law
solely by older techniques, and demanded a system under which government itself
would take certain responsibilities for the development and enforcement of law, for-
merly assumed to be entirely private in nature. In this setting the case-by-case
approach was found to have some value, but in addition such materials as legis-
lative history, statutory interpretation, and administrative rules and interpretations
gained relevance. Long after these developments occurred they were recognized
as a distinct phenomenon of our jurisprudence and labeled "administrative law."
In the last twenty years we have discovered that controlling our economic sys-
tem is a very complex task. The feeling is growing that survival and plenty can-
not be grasped by amelioratory efforts to patch things up after a crisis has occurred.
We are now concerned about preventing a crisis, about a long-range view of our
natural resources and security. Our fear of things which may happen has driven
us to planning in large areas of our economy. In these areas, the "administrative
process" has or should take on new meaning s9  Perhaps this new departure in
our legal system would be better understood if it is said that we have gone beyond
administrative law; that "planning law" has become an additional facet of our
jurisprudence. If this is so, the tools and techniques of plannifig must be recog-
nized as both useful and legally relevant to the particular task.
It is extremely important that the Civil Aeronautics Board succeed in its assigned
task to promote, develop, and encourage an air transportation system adequate to
future as well as present needs. The authority of the CAB over air transportation
could hardly be more comprehensive. It is one of the few agencies of our gov-
ernment with real national control over a particular area of the economy, a control
deemed necessary by the industry itself. 0 In some ways this type of control has
been this nation's alternative to nationalization of the industry; but this alternative
as presently administered has been such a costly venture9 that who can honestly
say that nationalization--even assuming the grossest inefficiencies-would not be
cheaper? It is the thesis of this paper that further chaos, excessive public expend-
itures, and perhaps even nationalization are inevitable unless the CAB can soon
discard the judicial machinery which served society so well before the Industrial
Revolution, but which is so unequal to the task of planning the future of air
transportation.
" Cf. JAmEs M. LANDIS, THE ADmINISTATIVE PROCESS (1938); DAVID F. CAVERS AND ASSOCIATES,
PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: PRICING STANDARDS (1947); and Mvuss S. McDOUGAL AND DAVID HABER,
PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT (1948).
"For example, see the testimony of the late Colonel Edgar S. Gorrell, one time President of the Air
Transport Association of American, in Hearings bcfore Subcommittee of Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on S. 2 and S. 176o, 75 th Cong., ist Sess. 498 (1937).
""The constantly increasing amounts of subsidy payments in the form of mail pay granted to some
of our air carriers has become a matter of national concern. The Government has paid out some oo
million dollars in mail pay for the year 1948, with additional sums yet to come, and mail pay during
1949 is likey to reach a total of 125 million dollars. This compares with a total of some 230 million
dollars paid to all of the airlines for all of the years since the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act
prior to 1948." Dissenting opinion of Member Jones in Air Freight Certificate Case, Docket 8zo, Order
Serial No. E-3o85, July 29, 1949, p. 40. S. J. Res. 92, introduced May 16, 1949, by Senator Johnson
of Colorado, uses the figure ixo million dollars for the year 1948.

